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Reply to Professor Ehrhardt
Professor Ehrhardt makes a number of important points in his
response, all of which should be taken into account in discussing the
admissibility of prior acts in child molestation cases. I shall, however,
for brevity's sake, limit my reply to a whirlwind consideration of one
particular issue: the consequences of Florida's adoption of rules similar
to Federal Rules of Evidence 414 and 415 in place of the admissibility
doctrine that has grown out of Heuring and its progeny.
Professor Ehrhardt points out that as a result of the adoption of
provisions similar to Rules 414 and 415 by the Florida Legislature there
probably will be a period of uncertainty while the courts define the factors to be taken into account in applying a section 90.403 balancing test
to the new standards of admissibility. Although I agree that such uncertainty will ensue, I would go further to suggest that this uncertainty may
never be resolved. The problem with Rules 414 and 415 is that their
sweeping language apparently assumes that evidence of other child
molestation offenses is legally relevant to whether or not a defendant has
committed the charged offense. Rules 414 and 415 provide no guidance
as to whether the prior act has to be one for which the defendant was
convicted or even charged, and they do not distinguish between evidence of such acts offered by the complainant and evidence offered by
someone else. This not only allows for the admission of evidence from
prior charges for which the defendant may have been acquitted, bringing
up double-jeopardy issues, but also for self-corroborating testimony by a
complainant.' Nowhere does the language of Rules 414 and 415 state
that they are subject to a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test,
though some circuits have required it, and even if we assume that the
Florida courts would require such a provision, or that the Florida legislature would be wiser than its federal counterpart and include one, the
question would ultimately remain: why is this evidence probative of
anything other than propensity? In such a case, the courts would either
have to endorse propensity evidence or return to the same position
where they began, trying to articulate a corroboration rationale. If the
courts were to hold such evidence relevant for its propensity value, then
we would find ourselves sliding down an extremely slippery slope,

1. I cannot in the space allotted even begin to examine the issue whether admissibility rules
based on Rules 414 and 415 could survive a challenge based in the Florida constitution, but it is a
question that certainly merits consideration.

666

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:665

abandoning our accusatorial system of justice in favor of an inquisitorial
system.
GEORGE FRANKLIN

